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The Ottoman origins of capitalism: Uneven and combined 
development and Eurocentrism
1
 
 
Kerem Nişancıoğlu 
Introduction: Capitalism, Eurocentrism and Uneven and Combined 
Development 
European sixteenth century history occupies a peculiar place in historical narratives.
2
 
Compared to the preceding medieval age, it was a period of striking social alteration 
and development; both in its encounter with unchartered territories and in its own self-
definition, this was very much Europe‘s ‗Age of Discovery‘. And yet, the sixteenth 
century bore none of the explosive marks of social unrest, revolution and radical 
transformation that came to define the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Such a duality is represented in the period‘s very characterisation as ‗Early 
Modern‘. The term ‗Modern‘ anticipates the developments of the next three hundred 
years, whereas the prefix ‗Early‘ suggests an epochal budding that has not quite 
blossomed, or the embryonic shaping of a society that is yet to come. Just as the 
culture of the Renaissance was defined by a Janus-faced view of the past and future, 
its geopolitics was characterised by new inventions in diplomacy and warfare that were 
nonetheless bound by the social relations of the old. And while filling the womb of a 
bloated aristocracy, trade, commerce and production displayed its first signs of tearing 
open this archaic order with the deep breath of primitive accumulation that preceded 
capitalism‘s screeching birth. 
                                                   
1
 I would like to thank Jamie Allinson, Alex Anievas, Gurminder Bhambra, Kamran Matin, Justin 
Rosenberg, Cemal Burak Tansel, and four anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and 
encouragement during the writing of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants at the Historical 
Materialism Conference 2012, Millennium Conference 2012 and Spectrum Conference 2012. Any 
errors are my own. 
2
 Here and throughout the paper the term ‗Europe‘ and ‗European‘ is deployed with the problematic 
implications of anachronism and intra-European divisions firmly in mind. As such it is used, unless 
specified, in a basic geographical sense, predominantly (but not exclusively) denoting England, 
France, Low Countries, Portugal, Hapsburg Spain and Austria, Germanic principalities, Hungary, and 
Italian city-states.  
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The flux of this historical moment is brilliantly captured in German Renaissance 
painter Hans Holbein‘s 1532 masterpiece The Ambassadors (fig. 1), which illustrates a 
meeting between French envoys Jean de Dinteville and George de Selve in London. 
The painting astounds because these two aristocratic subjects are placed at the 
periphery, and the only explicitly religious symbol, a cross, is heavily veiled by a 
curtain. While these two pillars of medieval power – the church and the aristocracy – 
are symbolically pushed to the side, the painting‘s focal point – the table – is littered 
with objects, with commodities. Was this a prophetic, if unwitting, forecast of 
feudalism‘s imminent decline? Did it anticipate a capitalist future where social relations 
would become ‗mediated by things‘?3 
Notwithstanding such speculation, the objects on Holbein‘s table constitute a vivid 
record of the geopolitical milieu that defined European international relations in the 
early sixteenth century.
4
 On the bottom right hand side of the table, a book of Lutheran 
hymns sits by a broken lute signifying the discord and growing divisions in 
Christendom. To the left of these items rests Martin Benhaim‘s terrestrial globe, made 
under the commission of Nuremberg merchants seeking to break the Portuguese hold 
on the spice trade. The globe is tilted, so that after European towns, ‗Affrica‘ and 
‗Brisilici R.‘ (Brazil) are the most legible markers, portraying the significance of the 
noticeable Linea Divisionis Castellanorum et Portugallenum (‗Line of division between 
Spain and Portugal‘). This line demarcated the division of the New World between 
Habsburg Spain (west of the line) and Portugal (east of the line), signifying the growing 
import of Atlantic sea routes, and the subsequent competition between European 
states over commercially profitable territories.  
In front of the globe is Peter Apian‘s A New and Well Grounded Instruction in All 
Merchant’s Arithmetic, an early textbook of commercial scholarship that covered profit-
loss calculation, trading customs, navigation and route mapping. Placed alongside 
Benhaim‘s globe, it demonstrates the inseparability of commercial interests from 
maritime exploration, as well as the increasingly global – and increasingly competitive 
– character of trade. Above these items, on the top of the table, numerous scientific 
                                                   
3
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) p.157  
4
 The ensuing interpretation is owed to the brilliant appraisal of The Ambassadors in Lisa Jardine, 
Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance (London: Papermac Macmillan, 1996) pp.425-436 
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instruments highlight the rapid development of techniques in seafaring. Continuing the 
theme of Christendom‘s decline, it also indicates a mounting shift away from the 
divinity of religion as the predominant episteme toward the rationality of scientific 
inquiry and humanism. 
Finally, linking the resting arms of the two ambassadors, and tying the objects 
together, is a Turkish rug. This alerts us to the fact that in the context of growing 
Atlantic trade, rebellion against Habsburg rule, and the primitive accumulation of 
capital, the Ottoman Empire was a persistent and prominent presence, lying behind 
and in many ways underpinning these manifold European developments.
5
 In this  
                                                   
5
 Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton, Global Interests: Renaissance Art Between East and West (New 
York: Cornell University Press , 2000) p.50 
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Fig. 1: Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533 
 
period, the Ottomans constituted the most prevalent non-Christian ‗Other‘ that 
confronted Europe,
6
 ‗persistently capturing the headlines and profoundly transforming 
the geopolitics of (and beyond) the Mediterranean world;‘7 this was ‗an Ottoman 
                                                   
6
 Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999) p.3 
7
 James G. Harper, ‗Introduction‘, in The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450-1750, ed. James 
G. Harper (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011) p.3 
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Europe almost as much as it was a Venetian or Habsburg one.‘8 Yet despite the latent 
centrality implied by Holbein‘s painting, dominant theorisations of Early Modern Europe 
have been constructed with the Ottomans in absentia. Whether in the sphere of the 
politics, economy, culture or ideology, the emergence of capitalist modernity is 
generally understood as a sui generis development specific to Europe. In short, the 
history of capitalism‘s origins is an unmistakably Eurocentric history.  
There are two moments to the Eurocentric approach that I will be the subject of 
scrutiny and criticism in this paper. The first is historical priority: based on the 
assumption that any given trajectory of development is the product of a society‘s own 
immanent dynamics, Eurocentrism ‗posits the endogenous and autonomous 
emergence of modernity in Europe.’
9
 Thus we find in cultural history that the flowering 
of the Renaissance was an intra-European phenomenon.
10
 Analyses of absolutism and 
the origins of the modern form of state are similarly conducted entirely on the terrain of 
Europe, with non-European cases appearing (if at all) comparatively.
11
 And the rise of 
capitalism is understood as an exclusively Western Europe phenomenon, wherein non-
European societies appear only as an exploited and passive periphery.
12
 In such 
accounts, Eurocentric historical priority tends to be fortified by the idea that it was the 
inherent superiority of Europe socially, politically, culturally and materially which made 
it exceptionally conducive to the development of capitalist modernity. 
                                                   
8
 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2004) p.225 
9
 Kamran Matin, ‗Redeeming The Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of 
Eurocentrism‘, European Journal of International Relations (iFirst: 2012)  
10
 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, (London: Penguin, 1990) 
11
 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, (London: New Left Books, 1974); Charles Tilly 
(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the 
Beginning to A.D. 1760, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 
12
 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London: Academic Press, 1974); David S. 
Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Are Some So Rich and Some So Poor? (London: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1998); Robert Brenner, ‗Agrarian Class Structure and Economic 
Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,‘ in The Brenner Debate, eds. Aston, T. H. et al (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert Brenner, ‗The Agrarian Roots of Capitalism,‘ in eds. 
Aston, T. H. et al, The Brenner Debate. Aston, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987),213-
328 
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This is not to say that studies of the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire have been 
heedlessly avoided
13
. But where its imperial apogee has been studied, it has been 
considered ‗social formation apart… largely a stranger to European culture, as an 
Islamic intrusion on Christendom.‘14 Here becomes evident the second moment of 
Eurocentrism: an internalist methodology. Expressed either through the comparative 
approach
15
 or methodological nationalism,
16
 Eurocentrism tends to overlook the 
multiple and interactive character of social development. Through this method the 
Ottomans (among other non-Europeans) have been opposed to Europe, either as an 
ideological ‗Other‘17 or as a comparative case study, against which the specificity and 
distinctiveness of Western modernity has been defined.
18
 Through numerous 
sociological trends the East has in turn been (re)constructed as an intransigent and 
threatening primordial foe, representing a fundamental and irreconcilable challenge to 
the values and traditions of the West.
19
 In establishing this ‗Iron Curtain‘20 of mutual 
obstinacy, both Eurocentric internalism and notions of historical priority have been 
reinforced, not only ideologically but also materially. 
One might expect International Relations (IR) – ‗a discipline that claims to be… of 
relevance to all peoples and states‘21 – to offer a way out of this Eurocentric cul-de-
sac. However, IR too has been built largely on Eurocentric assumptions.
22
 Mattingly‘s 
classic account of Renaissance diplomacy rests on the discoveries of the Italian city-
                                                   
13
 Two giants of European historiography, Braudel and Ranke insisted on the inclusion of the 
Ottomans within the Europe in the age of Phillip II and Charles V respectively. Fernand Braudel, The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, volume II (London: Collins, 1973); 
Leopold Ranke, The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in the Seventeenth Century (London: 
Whittaker & Co. 1843) 
14
 Anderson, Lineages, p.397 
15
 Gurminder K. Bhambra, 'Historical sociology, international relations and connected 
histories', Cambridge Review Of International Affairs, 23, no. 1 (2010) pp.127 – 143 
16
 Chernilo, D. 2010: ‗Methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy: classical resources for 
their critique.‘ Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 23 no. 1 (2010) pp.87-106; see also Matin, 
‗Redeeming‘ 
17
 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1979) 
18
 Malcom E. Yapp, ‗Europe in the Turkish Mirror,‘ Past and Present 137 no. 1 (1992) pp.134-155 
19
 Samuel P. Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996) 
20
 Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) p.12 
21
 Branwen Gruffyd-Jones, Decolonising International Relations, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006) p.2 
22
 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 
1760-2010. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
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states in their relations with each other.
23
 Similarly, the 1648 treaty of Westphalia – the 
very foundational ‗myth‘ of modern IR as a distinct practice and academic discipline24 – 
is generally considered the product of intra-European dynamics.
25
 Where they do exist, 
substantive engagements with the East tend to emphasise the ‗Iron Curtain‘ of 
ideological and cultural difference.
26
 The historical sociological turn in IR (HSIR)
27
 has 
not fared much better. Concerned explicitly with challenging ahistorical and 
unsociological conceptions of the international, HSIR has developed convincing 
arguments that uncover the transience, mutability and thus the historical specificity of 
modern IR. But HSIR too has predominantly conducted its analysis on the basis of 
European history.
28
  
Recent scholarship in the field of World History
29
 and Postcolonial Studies
30
 has 
attempted to ‗ReOrient‘31 historiography in order to both destabilize and potentially 
                                                   
23
 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York: Dover Publications, 1988)  
24
 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648 (London: Verso, 2003) 
25
 See John M. Hobson, ‗Provincializing Westphalia: The Eastern Origins of Sovereignty‘ International 
Politics, 46, no. 6 (2009) pp.671-690; Turan Kayaoglu, ‗Westphalian Eurocentrism in International 
Relations Theory‘, International Studies Review, 12, no. 2 (2010) pp.193-217 
26
 For instance in the English School. See Martin Wight, ed. Systems of States. (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1977); Hadley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1977); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (New York:  
Routledge, 1992) 
27
 See Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology (London: Routledge, 1998); 
Stephen Hobden and John Hobson eds. Historical Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); George Lawson, ‗Historical sociology in international relations: 
open society, research programme and vocation.‘ International politics, (2007) 44 no.4 pp.343-368 
28
 Bhambra, ‗'Historical sociology‘; Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‗Talking Among Themselves? Weberian 
and Marxist Historical Sociologies as Dialogues Without ―Others.‖ Millenium 39 no. 1 (2011) pp.667-
681 
29
 James Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric 
History (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: 
China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 
2000); John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge:Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); Jack Goody, The Theft of History (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jack 
Goldstone, Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History 1500-1850 (New York: McGraw Hill, 
2008) 
30
 Homi K. Bhaba, The Location of Culture. (London: Routledge, 1994); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
‗Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia.‘ Modern Asian 
Studies (1997) Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 735-762; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2000); Tarak Barkawi and 
Mark Laffey, ‗The postcolonial moment in security studies,‘ Review of International Studies (2006) 32, 
pp.329–352; Robbie Shilliam (ed), International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, 
Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity (London: Routledge, 2010); Amitav Ancharya, 
‗Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West.‘ Millennium, 
(2011) 39(3), pp. 619-637; B. Gruffyd Jones, ed. Decolonizing; Bhambra, ‗Talking,‘; Bhambra, 
‗Historical‘ 
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escape the Eurocentric trap. However, despite providing extensive additional empirical 
frameworks that have decentred the historical priority of Europe, these works have 
tended to eschew any concomitant theorisation of capitalism‘s origins in light of these 
empirical findings. In the absence of such an endeavour the dominant Eurocentric 
theorisations of capitalism‘s origins have either suffered no fatal blows or, at worst, 
been actively reproduced.
32
 To modify Frederick Cooper‘s call to arms: in order to truly 
‗provincialize‘ Europe one must dissect European history itself, and there is no more 
central myth to be dissected than that of narrating European history around the history 
of capitalism.
33
 A truly non-Eurocentric interpretation of history should seek to pose an 
alternative theoretical framework to Eurocentric conceptions in which to conduct 
historical and sociological study.
34
 
Attempts to expand Trotsky‘s theory of Uneven and Combined Development 
(U&CD) as an historically and sociologically sensitive theory of the international
35
 have 
sought to rescue historical materialist accounts from the charge of Eurocentrism, and in 
doing so provide precisely the sort of alternative theorization of history that World 
Historical and Postcolonial approaches have hitherto elided.
36
 However, there remain 
certain tensions that the theory is yet to overcome. John Hobson suggests U&CD is no 
less guilty of conflating ‗the international‘ with exclusively ‗intra-European relations‘, 
thus falling prey to the typical Eurocentric assumption of ‗Western priority and Eastern 
                                                                                                                                              
31
 A.G. Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley:University of California Press, 
1998) 
32
 Sandra Halperin, International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of 
Modernity. In: B. Gruffyd Jones, ed. Decolonizing International Relations. (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006) p. 43 
33
 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005) p.22 
34
 Matin, ‗Redeeming‘, p.12 
35
 Justin Rosenberg, ‗Why is There no International Historical Sociology?‘, European Journal of 
International Relations, 12 no. 3 (2006) pp.307-340; Justin Rosenberg, ‗Basic Problems in the Theory 
of Uneven and Combined Development. Part II: Unevenness and Political Multiplicity‘. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 23, no. 1 (2010) 165-189; Kamran Matin, ‗Uneven and Combined 
Development in World History: The International Relations of State-formation in Premodern Iran‘, 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 13, no. 3 (2007) pp.419-447; see also Neil 
Davidson, ‗Putting the Nation Back into the International.‘ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
22, no. 1 (2009) 9-28; Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas, ‗Approaching the ―international‖: beyond 
Political Marxism‘, in ed. Anievas Marxism and World Politics (London: Routledge, 2010) pp.197-214 
36
 See Matin, ‗U&CD‘; Matin ‗Redeeming‘; Robert Shilliam, ‗The Atlantic as a Vector of Uneven and 
Combined Development‘ Cambridge Review of International Relations, 22 no. 1 (2009) 69-88; John 
Hobson, ‗What‘s at Stake in the Neo-Trotskyist Debate? Towards a Non-Eurocentric Historical 
Sociology of Uneven and Combined Development‘ Millennium, 40, no. 1 (2011) 
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passivity.‘37 Similarly, Gurminder Bhambra suggests that for all of U&CD‘s focus on 
societal difference, its very origins and dynamism remains wedded to a Eurocentric 
conception of capitalism derived from the Enlightenment conception of stadial 
development.
38
 Without problematizing the European origins of capitalism, the non-
West remains excluded as an empirically significant yet theoretically secondary 
entity.
39
 For U&CD to simply invoke inter-societal processes is therefore not enough. It 
must also be capable of establishing an alternative conception of capitalism that 
includes the historical significance of non-European societies as active agents while 
departing from a stadial conception of development.  
In this paper, I propose we ‗return to Holbein‘ via Trotsky, and attempt to recapture 
the significance of the Ottomans in the geopolitics of the long sixteenth century by 
deploying the U&CD as a theoretical framework. In particular, I seek to bring out the 
causal impact of the Ottoman Empire on the primary historical themes in The 
Ambassadors – the political fragmentation of feudal Europe in resistance to Habsburg 
attempts at Empire building, the structural shift away from the geopolitical and 
commercial centrality of the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic, and the primitive 
accumulation of capital. I argue that these developments – each crucial to the 
emergence of capitalism – were causally inseparable from Ottoman geopolitical 
pressure on Europe. In developing this argument, I seek to challenge and criticize 
Eurocentrism through the theory of U&CD and in the process defend its non-
Eurocentric credentials. I argue that U&CD can make a positive and illuminating 
contribution to these debates because it speaks directly to each of the two moments of 
Eurocentrism identified above. By positing the multilinear character of development as 
its ‗most general law,‘40 uneven development provides a corrective to the ontological 
singularity and attendant unilinear conception of history that underpins assumptions of 
historical priority.
41
 By positing the inherently interactive character of this multiplicity, 
                                                   
37
 Hobson, ‗What‘s at Stake?‘ p.153. 
38
 Bhambra, ‗Talking‘, p. 676 
39
 Bhambra, ‗Talking,‘ p.668; 673; cf. Bhambra, ‗Historical‘ p.128; 135; Cemal Burak Tansel, ‗Deafing 
Silence: Historical Materialism, International Relations, and the Question of the International.‘ Paper 
presented at First Spectrum Conference on Global Studies: Historical Sociology, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations 2nd-3rd November, 2012, pp.1-25, pp.10-12 
40
 Leon Trotsky The History of the Russian Revolution (London: Pathfinder Press, 2007) 28 
41
 Rosenberg‘ Why?‘ p.313 
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‗combined development'42 challenges the methodological internalism of the 
comparative approach. 
How this theoretical framework is operationalized can be demonstrated through an 
outline of U&CD‘s core concepts – unevenness and combination. Unevenness denotes 
spatial and temporal variations between societies as an ontological feature and thus 
perennial sociological condition of human history. As both cause and effect of this 
international differentiation, unevenness is also expressed in the forms of internal 
differentiation that give localities their own peculiar form of development.
43
 For 
example, in The History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky emphasises how 
imbalances in Russia‘s institutional, cultural and class relations contrasted with ‗more 
advanced‘ European forms44 due its peculiar inter-societal position standing both 
geographically and historically between Europe and Asia.
45
 The ontological fact of 
multiplicity thus disrupts any conception of unilinearity implied by stadial theories of 
development: 
‗[A]t any given historical point, the human world has comprised a variety of societies, 
of differing sizes, cultural forms and levels of material development. Empirically 
speaking, there is not, and never has been, a single path taken by social 
development.‘46  
Moreover, such differentiation in social forms is not generated hermetically and 
autonomously, but interactively. Developmentally differentiated societies constantly 
impact upon one another‘s development – what Trotsky called ‗the whip of external 
necessity‘.47 Consequently the unevenness of social development is constituted not 
only by internal social relations but also by social relations between societies. The 
relational character that emerges out of this interactive multiplicity is what Trotsky 
terms ‗combined development’. For example, Trotsky argues that the impulse for 
Russia‘s capitalist development was the necessity of ‗catching up‘ with the 
                                                   
42
 Trotsky, History, p.28 
43
 Luke Cooper, ‗Uneven and combined development in modern world history: Chinese economic 
reform in the longue durée of capitalist modernity.‘ Paper presented at International Studies 
Association Annual Convention, San Diego, 1 – 4 April 2012, p.6. 
44
 Trotsky, History, p.474-476. 
45
 Trotsky, History, p.26. 
46
 Rosenberg, ‗Why?‘ p.313 
47
 Trotsky, History, p.28; 477 
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developmentally more advanced European states. The ‗privilege‘48 of Russia‘s 
backwardness meant that this catch up occurred by assimilating the ‗ready-made‘ 
developmental achievements of advanced capitalist countries, allowing Russia to skip 
over the ‗intermediate steps‘ of development.49 In contrast to the European model that 
Russia sought to emulate, capitalist development was refracted through pre-existing 
local social relations, giving rise to further developmental unevenness between Russia 
and its European counterparts. It was this peculiarity of Russia‘s combined 
development that made it uniquely open to proletarian revolution. Combined 
development thus involves a ‗drawing together of the different stages of the journey‘‘50 
– of combining the spatio-temporally variegated experiences of different societies – into 
amalgams of ‗contemporary and more archaic.‘51  
In short, U&CD posits that historical processes are always the outcome of multiple 
determinations arising from spatially diverse developmental trajectories that converge 
or combine in any given conjuncture. Thus instead of reproducing a stadial conception 
of development, U&CD ‗scrambles and subverts it.‘52 And rather than eliding the 
significance of non-Western agency, U&CD opens the potential to reinsert it into our 
historical narratives and theoretical conceptualisations. Seen in this light, the 
Eurocentric emphasis in the historiography of capitalism‘s origins becomes 
questionable. For a singular emphasis on Europe would constitute only one of many 
‗spatio-temporal vectors of U&CD‘53 that would have to be complimented and 
combined with other determinations analysed from alternative spatial vantage points;
54
 
one that would have to be related to – among others – extra-European determinations 
bound in the histories of colonialism,
55
 slavery
56
 and global trade.
57
 Put simply, U&CD 
stresses an ‗internationalist historiography‘58 of the origins of capitalism.  
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However, I do not intend to argue that capitalism‘s origins were entirely extra-
European, for this would substitute one ethnocentrism with another; nor do I seek to 
substantially diminish the centrality or uniqueness of Europe in this process. As such, 
and despite the provocative nature of the title, this paper does not provide a full or total 
account of the origins of capitalism. It is rather restricted to the considerably more 
modest claim and demonstration that the Euro-Ottoman relations of the Early Modern 
period constituted one of many determinations that needs to be integrated, indeed 
combined, with other spatio-temporally distinct historical determinations, both 
European and extra-European. But this paper seeks to go beyond simply adding an 
alternative empirical framework to our understanding of capitalism‘s origins. What must 
also be stressed is that in addition to challenging Eurocentrism in a negative sense, a 
positive elaboration of U&CD can also provide an alternative theoretical framework in 
which capitalism‘s origins can be understood.  
In the ensuing examination of Euro-Ottoman relations, these two core concepts – 
unevenness and combination – will order the structure. In the first section I aim to 
challenge the Eurocentric assumption of historical priority, by demonstrating that 
sixteenth century Euro-Ottoman relations were marked by material relations of uneven 
development. Accordingly unevenness denotes, firstly, the political, military, economic 
and territorial advantages held by the Ottoman Empire over Europe; and secondly, the 
unevenness in social forms of internal differentiation – of ruling and ruled class in 
agrarian production on the one hand, and between merchant and state on the other. 
These forms of unevenness entailed both an Ottoman ‗whip of external necessity‘ and 
a European ‗privilege of backwardness‘ which I argue were crucial preconditions for the 
eventual emergence of capitalism within Europe.
59
 In the second section, I attempt to 
expose the limitations of methodological internalism by examining the importance of 
the extensive interactivity that this whip of external necessity entailed – a form of 
combined development. In particular I argue that the Euro-Ottoman ‗combination‘ 
causally impacted European development in three crucial ways. Firstly, it curtailed the 
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imperial threat of the Habsburgs, abetting the fragmentation of Europe; secondly, in 
doing so it brought about a structural shift from Mediterranean to Atlantic trade and 
Northwest European dominance; thirdly, these two factors combined to give England 
the geopolitical space in which the primitive accumulation of capital could take place.  
Unevenness: a clash of social reproduction 
Ottoman relations with the outside world have primarily been constructed through an 
idealised and uncritical notion of diplomatic precepts rooted in Sharia law.
60
 Here, the 
supposed self-regarded superiority of the Ottomans constituted the basis of a unilateral 
policy toward international affairs, and a religious commitment to permanent war with 
Europe. This mystified conception of Euro-Ottoman relations – articulated as a 
continuation of the eternal clash between Christianity and Islam – was captured in the 
literature, philosophy and art of Early Modern Europe. In the work of artist Leonardo 
Dati, Sultan Mehment II was portrayed as a minion of the devil,
61
 while Martin Luther 
argued that the Ottomans were a punishment from God for the degeneration of 
Christianity.
62
 Yet alongside this widespread belligerence, there were also significant 
levels of European appreciation for Ottoman achievements. For example, reflecting the 
resistance to the Habsburg alliance, German pamphleteers downplayed the need to 
intervene militarily against the Ottomans, with some pointing to the Turks‘ efficiency as 
a model for German reform,
63
 while the legal code established by Suleiman II was 
studied by a legal mission sent from England by Henry VIII.
64
 In their examinations of 
European state forms, Machiavelli, Bodin, Bacon, Montaigne and Giovolo all heralded 
Ottoman military discipline and administrative efficiency.
65
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This mixture of fear, awe, belligerence and admiration reflected a material relation 
of unevenness in which the Ottomans held numerous direct advantages over their 
European allies and foes.
66
 The Ottomans were able to raise vast and loyal armies for 
military campaigns, while maintaining comparatively uninterrupted lines of 
communication and supplies.
67
 Ottoman intra-ruling class unity also contrasted 
significantly with the fragmentation associated with the parcellized sovereignty of 
feudal Europe,
68
 a developmental advantage often exploited by the Ottoman Empire in 
military campaigns
69
 making them geopolitical accumulators – empire builders – 
extraordinaires. This relation of unevenness was neatly captured by Aeneas Sylvius 
(future Pope Pius II) who, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, reflected on the 
existential threat the Ottomans posed to a disunited Christendom: 
 ‗[Christendom] is a body without a head, a republic without laws or magistrates… 
every state has a separate prince, and every prince has a separate interest… Who 
will make the English love the French? Who will unite the Genoese and the 
Aragonese? Who will reconcile the Germans with the Hungarians and Bohemians?... 
If you lead a small army against the Turks you will easily be overcome; if a large one, 
it will soon fall into confusion.‘70  
While Europe struggled with divisions, the Ottomans faced them as a unified 
resourceful and disciplined force,
71
 one that was able to consistently expand into 
Europe and beyond, absorbing and converting Europeans to the ‗Ottoman way.‘ As a 
contemporary lamented:  
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‗how it comes to pass, that so many of our men should continually revolt, and abjuring 
all Christian rites, become affectors of that impious Mahumetane sect, whilst on the 
other part we finde none or very few of those repaying unto us.‘72 
The unevenness between the Ottomans and Europe was underpinned by the 
predominant practices of social reproduction created by forms of internal differentiation. 
This internally differentiated form of unevenness was expressed in two ways. The first 
was in the relations that pertained among social classes based on predominantly 
agrarian production: between exploiter and exploited (and therefore also in the forms 
and character of surplus appropriation by the ruling class in these respective societies); 
and between different sections of the ruling class (and hence political relations as 
such). The second was the relationship between merchants and states that these 
respective forms of social reproduction gave rise to. These forms of unevenness will be 
considered in turn. 
Agrarian Class Relations and Ruling class Reproduction 
Ottoman society was characterised by a tributary mode of production, defined firstly, by 
the vertical opposition of a ruling, tax collecting, class in a contradictory relationship 
with a class of peasants that were exploited for the appropriation of productive 
surplus;
73
 and secondly, by the horizontal differentiation between ‗landed nobility‘ and 
‗patrimonial authority‘ within the tax collecting class, wherein the latter controlled the 
former as well as the means of production.
74
  
The first – ruling class-peasant – division was distinct from the lord-peasant 
relation in Europe due to the appropriation of surplus through tax (as opposed to rent) 
collection and the regulation of appropriation by regional and central agents of the 
Ottoman state.
75
 This meant that in comparison to Europe, peasants had greater 
access to their surplus because of the preservation of subsistence plots, as well as 
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state fixed limitations on taxation by local intermediaries.
76
 Peasants also had 
inalienable rights to land,
77
 were better protected from market fluctuations,
78
 had the 
option – albeit limited – to legal recourse should their conditions worsen79 and were 
legally considered free.
80
 
The second division – between landed nobility and patrimonial authority – was 
distinct from intra-ruling class relations in Europe because all land was formally owned 
by the Sultan, while military fiefs were predominantly non-hereditary, changeable and 
regularly rotated amongst individuals in the ruling class.
81
 This created a contradictory 
distribution of political power and surplus, forming a centre-periphery socio-political 
structure between sections of the ruling class.
82
 Located primarily in Constantinople, 
the Ottoman centre consisted in the Sultan and his slave corps – comprising a large 
and unified bureaucratic administration and the Janissary standing army. This 
centralised state was coupled with devolution of power and relative autonomy of 
authority, jurisdiction and religion in the Ottoman provinces.
83
  
As an offshoot of the devolution of power, the Ottomans often conquered territories 
without fundamentally transforming their own peculiar rules of reproduction be it legal, 
ideological, and even material.
84
 Consequently the Ottomans proved adept at 
mobilising local resources and absorbing the material and ideational advances of 
occupied territories. (Geo)political accumulation also played an essential role in 
maintaining the loyalty of disparate sections of the ruling class, as well as coercing 
rebellions when necessary. Provincial power holders and Janissaries were allocated 
spoils of conquest – often booty, but primarily land – as a means of maintaining 
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consent, while the practice of relocating notables to different regions of the empire 
displaced any potential accumulation of provincial power.
85
  
These devices of ruling class reproduction proved remarkably efficient, 
considerably more so than the contemporaneous feudal form found in Europe. Due to 
the nature of Ottoman power-sharing and the relocation of provincial landholders, there 
was limited potential for unified class interests acting outside the purview of – or 
counter to – the interests of the Ottoman state.86 Instead, discontented sections of the 
ruling class sought to articulate disaffection within the confines of the extant political 
system, while the state was able to maintain the internal integrity of the empire by co-
opting local elites
87
 or coercively centralizing power.
88
 Furthermore, the relatively 
lenient form of surplus extraction levied on Ottoman peasants, as well as tolerance for 
local religions and identities, meant that rebellion in the countryside was a less marked 
feature of the Ottoman tributary mode than the European feudal mode.
89
 Hence there 
was little impulse or necessity for reform of the tributary system from above, or 
significant pressure for revolution from below. 
The unity and stability of the Ottoman Empire contrasted significantly with 
European forms of social reproduction. These too were predominantly based agrarian 
production where peasants had direct access to means of production and also 
therefore subsistence. And as with the Ottoman Empire this condition meant that an 
aristocratic ruling class required political, ideological and military means in order to 
exploit this peasantry and extract a surplus for the purpose of lordly consumption. 
However, unlike the Ottoman Empire these means were not controlled by or 
concentrated in a centralized and unified state, but were dispersed across the nobility. 
Consequently peasants were more susceptible to coercive squeezes on their 
productivity, and had no recourse to outside legal protection from their lords. This 
regularly led to declining living conditions and in turn, rural rebellions. At the same time, 
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the dispersion of coercive capabilities meant that political authority in Europe was 
fragmented, parcellized and therefore also highly competitive, with heightened intra-
lordly struggle taking place over territory both within and outside of feudal ‗states.‘90 In 
short, both war and rebellion was more pronounced within Europe than it was within 
Ottoman territories. 
Merchants, the state and war 
These conditions determined peculiar and uneven relations between merchants and 
the state. Because of the fragmented and parcellized character of political power, 
Europeans that wanted to make war required extraordinary financing outside of day to 
day ruling class reproduction. In order to raise armies, European rulers borrowed from 
international banking houses
91
 or asked wealthy and powerful sections of society for 
contributions, either in terms of military support or taxes.
92
 This was often conducted 
via ‗local estates and assemblies or city-leagues in which the merchant-entrepreneurial 
class wielded significant – even military – power.‘93 Hence a by-product of European 
feudal war-making was an attendant rise in the political autonomy, power and influence 
of merchants, with increasing degrees of representation in the decision making 
structures of states.
94
 
In contrast, the Ottoman Empire had little requirement for monetary financing 
outside of the customary levies already imposed on agrarian production. Consequently, 
there was scarce potential for autonomous merchant activity outside of the functional 
requirements of the tributary state. The relations between merchants and the Ottoman 
ruling class were balanced considerably in favour of the latter, who exercised 
significant control over merchant activity through the guild system;
95
 conflicts or 
tensions between merchants and guilds tended to curtail merchant autonomy and 
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power,
96
 while merchant access to state apparatuses and decision making was 
limited.
97
 Accumulation of wealth was discouraged and restricted by controlling coin 
circulation, production and prices and anti-luxury laws were deployed to confiscate 
merchant fortunes.
98
 Interregional trade was heavily regulated, in which provisions for 
towns came almost entirely from their own hinterlands thus narrowing the geographical 
remit of production and distribution to local regions.
99
 Caravan endpoints 
geographically coincided with seats of government authority, ensuring close 
supervision of prices and commodities traded. Tax on trade enabled state extraction of 
surpluses from mercantile activity.
100
  
The tension between the state and merchants was also present geopolitically. For 
a ruling class fundamentally dependent on agriculture and tribute for their reproduction, 
the capture of trade routes was considered functional to tributary power, to bring those 
outside of it imperial purview within its tributary regime.
101
 While the state could at 
times show signs of ‗economic intentionality,‘102 merchants were not considered 
important enough for state protection or support – agriculture remained the priority. 
Following the capture of the Mamluk Empire in 1517, the Ottoman naval commander 
Selman Reis believed that the Portuguese could have been driven out of the India 
Ocean.
103
 But instead, imperial policy reverted to territorial expansion into the 
agriculturally more fertile and populous territories of South East Europe. That the 
Ottomans did not pursue the Indian course was primarily due to the reproductive 
requirements of a ruling class based on agrarian production,
104
 reflecting the swelling 
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claims made by provincial notables on access to booty, land, and thus power as 
such.
105
  
In contrast, European powers were explicitly and intimately focussed on bringing 
under direct conquest and political control commercially valuable territories for 
specifically commercial purposes. The reason was due to the relative backwardness of 
European feudal reproduction which was dependent of the wealth drawn from 
merchants and financiers to either fund (geo)political accumulation (in the case of 
Habsburg Spain and Austria) or for the direct reproduction of the ruling class itself (in 
the case of city-states such as Genoa and Venice). Consequently, the state was 
sensitive to, or at the behest of, merchant interests, wherein state resources, especially 
military, were deployed in order to obtain commercial advantages.
106
 And such was the 
extent and autonomy of merchant power that no European Emperor could have 
withdrawn or demanded the return of ships in the Indian Ocean as the Ottomans had 
done.
107
 
These uneven internal relations – between ruling and ruled class in agrarian 
production on the one hand, and between state and merchant of the other – can 
therefore be demonstrated as a determinant of an international relation of Euro-
Ottoman unevenness – the relative backwardness of the European ruling classes, and 
the comparative weakness in its form of social reproduction when opposed to the 
Ottoman Empire. These European ‗privileges of backwardness‘ encouraged and 
compelled its people – both ruling and ruled classes – to develop and adopt new ways 
of securing their social reproduction. At the same time, the relative strength of the 
Ottoman social form entailed a ‗disadvantage of progressiveness‘, wherein the stability 
of social reproduction provided no immanent impulse for change or development. This 
relation of unevenness goes some way to explaining why the so-called miracle of 
capitalism would occur in Europe, and why it would not be repeated in Ottoman 
territories. That this divergence was a product of Ottoman progressiveness and 
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European backwardness suggests that Eurocentric assumptions of historical priority 
need to be reconsidered. Moreover, these two elements – Ottoman strength; European 
privilege of backwardness – were ultimately interrelated and co-constitutive 
phenomena. As a consequence of its comparative strength, the geopolitical pressure of 
Ottomans constantly affected and redirected European development, in turn 
compelling changes in its forms social reproduction.
108
 This meant that while the 
Ottomans were faced as a significant existential threat, they were also an opportunity 
for the most backward part of Europe – the Northwest – to outflank and outstrip the 
more advanced Habsburg Empire and Italian city-states.  
Combination: Euro-Ottoman geopolitical relations 
Due to the European condition of backwardness, the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
recovery of European feudalism, and the flourishing of commerce and the cultural 
Renaissance that accompanied it, were directly connected to the establishment of 
peaceful lines of communication and trade between East and West that followed the 
expansion and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire.
109
 Through the institutional 
support of the Ottoman state, Pax Ottomana lowered commercial protection and 
transaction costs, established relatively uniform trading practices and hastened the 
alacrity of trade. On land and sea Ottoman rule was crucial to safeguarding traders 
from banditry or piracy, while building roads and canal routes that would facilitate 
interregional trade.
110
 The emergence of a Pax Ottomana brought together highways of 
commerce linking Russia and Central Asia with Europe via the Black Sea, and the 
Levant and North Africa to the Indian Ocean where the bulk of Euro-Asian trade was 
conducted.
111
 The Ottoman Empire thus brought about an economic and geographic 
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combination of otherwise disparate communities, acting as ‗the hinge that connected 
the rapidly growing economies of Europe with those of the East‘ (see fig. 2).112  
 Trade and communication between the Ottomans and Europe gave rise to 
various kinds of combined development assisting the transmission of social and 
technological knowledge, leading to a spurt of development in European 
manufacturing, particularly those sectors imitating Eastern products.
113
 The boost in 
French economic activity following a trade agreement with the Ottomans led to the 
proto-industrialisation of towns such as Marseille.
114
 The competition in silk markets 
between the Levant and Venice inspired the creation of the hydraulic mill in Bologna 
which would later be adapted to construct Lombe‘s Mill in Derby in the early eighteenth 
century
115
 – arguably the world‘s first fully mechanised factory.116 Because Ottoman 
merchants themselves were active agents in bolstering trade within the Empire and 
beyond, their own credit system and methods of accumulation such as the simsar 
monopoly association and mudaraba advance system became woven into the fabric of 
European commercial relations, prefiguring the ‗complete control of a commodity from 
production to sale‘117 that would become the hallmark of company capitalism.118 Such  
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Fig. 2 Eurasian trade routes during Pax Ottmana 
 
combination was especially pronounced in the development of European culture over 
the course of the Renaissance.
119
 In certain cases, European artists such as Gentile 
Bellini and Constanzo da Ferrara spent time in the Ottoman court and worked under 
the Sultan‘s commission.120 Ottoman imagery was widely featured often by Italian 
Renaissance painters seeking to elicit support for crusades by featuring the Ottomans 
as the embodiment of the Islamic threat.
121
 Humanist literature – from Thomas More to 
William Shakespeare – would similarly deploy the Ottomans as a comparative of 
allegorical vehicle through which medieval forms European statecraft could be 
analysed and criticised.
122
 This emphasis of Euro-Ottoman comparison therefore 
reflected a period of self-examination and criticism in the context of Christendom‘s 
breakdown as a unifying principle.
123
 It was in the context of the Ottoman threat, that 
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propagandists, politicians and thinkers began talking about Europe as a normative as 
well as geographical concept: the aforementioned Aneaus Sylvius invented the very 
adjective ‗European‘ following the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans,124 while 
Habsburg and Polish publicists began appealing to secular European values in order to 
defend Hungarian territories from Ottoman incursions.
125
  
An Ottoman ‘whip of external necessity’ 
Euro-Ottoman combined development was however most pronounced under the ‗whip‘ 
of Ottoman geopolitical pressure on Europe. Indeed, despite the regenerative effects of 
Pax Ottomana, for most of Europe the growth of the Ottoman Empire was met with 
trepidation and hostility in equal measure. The efficacy of the Ottoman military meant 
that from the mid-fifteenth century and ‗[u]p to 1596 there was no question of 
international politics which did not somehow involve the Ottomans.‘126 Such 
involvement was permanent and regularly hostile. In an event that shook Europe, the 
Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453. By the end of fifteenth century, they had 
captured Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Albania and Croatia. The Ottoman whip of 
geopolitical pressure was not restricted to land and was often at its fiercest in the 
Mediterranean, where military conflict tended to blight seafaring conditions often 
‗cutting the arteries of Venetian seaborne trade‘127. The Spanish and the Portuguese 
fared little better, failing to push into a sea rife with Ottoman sponsored corsair attacks 
on merchant ships.
128
 Moreover, following Ottoman conquests of the Black Sea and 
Red Sea, hitherto dominant European traders were only allowed conditional 
admittance.
129
 Having obtained these territories, commercial activity became subject to 
aforementioned state regulations and supervision thus limiting the export of key 
commodities such as timber, horses, grain and alum.
130
  
Having pressed on to Budapest and Vienna in the 1520s, Ottoman armies came 
into direct conflict with the Habsburgs, thus instantiating a geopolitical rivalry that would 
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continue unabated until the end of the seventeenth century. But aside from the regular 
use of ‗hard power‘ the Ottomans also sought to break the unity of the Habsburg 
Empire by deploying the more ‗soft‘ methods of alliance building.131 The significance of 
these ‗unholy alliances‘ was revealed in a candid admission by Francis I in 1531: 
 ‗I keenly desire the Turk powerful and ready for war, not for himself, because he is an 
infidel and we are Christians, but to undermine the emperor‘s power to force heavy 
expenses upon him and to reassure all other governments against so powerful an 
enemy.‘132  
The military pressure of the Ottoman Empire was a crucial contributing factor in the 
origins and expansion of the Reformation.
133
 Lutheran revolts swept through Germany 
during a period in which the Habsburgs were especially dependent on German military 
support and financial aid in wars against the Ottomans. This only proved forthcoming 
on the condition that Charles V agreed to religious reforms. In this context, Lutherans 
sought to carve out greater religious freedom whenever conflict between the Ottomans 
and Habsburgs surfaced, using the Ottoman threat as a bargaining chip in negotiations 
with Charles V.
134
 The ensuing spread of the Reformation often occurred in territories 
that bore the mark of an Ottoman impact – especially those affected by Calvinism.135 
These pressures underwrote the break-up of the Habsburg Empire – first into Austro-
Hungarian and Spanish divisions, secondly with independence for the Dutch. Here the 
Ottomans again played active role, by attempting to cultivate coalitions with Protestants 
in the Low Countries and Moriscoes in Spain.
136
 As the unifying power of Christendom 
receded under military duress, Ottoman attitudes towards religious freedom and local 
autonomy came to be replicated in European territories.  
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One of the more pertinent historical peculiarities of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century was the inability of the Habsburg Emperors to fulfil the holy mission of 
establishing and maintaining an imperial hegemony in the lands of Christendom.
137
 In 
many ways it was the causal impact of the Ottoman ‗whip of external necessity‘ that 
‗frustrated universal imperial ambitions‘ by perpetuating the ‗multiple polities within the 
cultural unity of Christian Europe.‘138 The uneven and combined development of 
relations between the Ottomans and Europe therefore created further developmental 
unevenness by exacerbating the fragmented and divided character of European 
feudalism. Consequently, ‗combination‘ was itself felt unevenly, with its specific causal 
effects varying across different European states. The more ‗advanced‘ European states 
constituted the primary focus of Ottoman military operations, while alliances with more 
‗backward‘ European states were utilised to balance against the Habsburgs. As such, 
while the Habsburgs, Genoese, Venetians, Spanish and Portuguese were habitually 
engaged with the Ottomans, Northwestern European states such as France, the Low 
Countries and particularly Britain were afforded the geopolitical space required to 
conduct modern state-building. This ‗privilege of backwardness‘ became manifest 
along two causal vectors of combination – firstly, by bringing about a structural shift 
away from the dominance of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; secondly, by isolating 
England from Habsburg geopolitical pressure. 
The Ottoman blockade and the emergence of the Atlantic 
Through imperial conquest, many of the key channels of European trade with the East 
fell under Ottoman control. Thus besides facilitating European commerce in general, 
Pax Ottomana broke the monopoly previously held by leading traders (primarily 
Venetian and Genoese) in the Mediterranean and Black Sea,
139
 exposing these 
markets to competition from Northwest Europeans, as well as Ragusan, Armenian and 
Jewish merchants under Ottoman suzerainty.
140
 By blocking the most dominant 
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European powers from their customary conduits to Eastern markets, the Ottomans 
directly compelled them to pursue alternative routes. Having lost its Black Sea 
monopoly, Genoa sought to circumvent the Ottoman passage to Indian and Far 
Eastern markets,
141
 while turning to private business and financial operations in 
Western Europe and the Atlantic.
142
 With the Ottoman dominated Mediterranean 
inaccessible to Genoese capital, the Atlantic became a considerably more promising 
avenue for commercial activity.
143
 Thus both in Spain and in Portugal, the relationship 
between Genoese merchant-financiers and New World colonialists grew as Genoa‘s 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean declined. The Atlantic ventures that this alliance 
gave rise to were ultimately possible through the investments of Genoese capital that 
had been forced out of the Mediterranean by the Ottomans. ‗It was‘, writes Eric 
Mielants, ‗precisely the inter-city-state competition for access to Eastern markets and 
the threat of the expanding Ottoman Empire that led to the discovery of the 
Americas.‘144  
Capitulations
145
 came to play a major role in this process, mediating European 
commercial and Ottoman geopolitical interests through alliance building on the one 
hand and blockading rivals on the other. The most commercially ‗advanced‘ European 
states – the Habsburgs, Genoese, Venetians, Spanish and Portuguese – were 
excluded, while the more ‗backward‘ French (1536), English (1583) and Dutch (1612) 
were granted capitulations. Political in scope for the Ottomans, these commercial 
agreements proved an economic boon for the merchants of Northwest Europe. States 
that had been otherwise peripheral to the Mediterranean (and thus Eurasian) 
commerce were now able to trade under significantly advantageous terms compared to 
their competitors. Plugged into the security afforded by the Ottoman state along its 
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trade routes, Northwest European connections with Asian commodity markets were 
significantly expedited.
146
 
Over the course of the sixteenth century, Ottoman geopolitical manoeuvres thus 
brought about a ‗structural shift,‘147 from the commercial dominance of Adriatic city-
states such as Genoa and Venice, towards English and Dutch supremacy. The 
competition over markets that arose from this shift gave a major impulse to the 
development of company capitalism and anticipated the increasing unity of merchant 
and state interests that became a hallmark of the English and Dutch politics in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century.
148
 These developments would stimulate efforts to 
build permanent circuits of capital through the advance system, in turn escalating 
merchant intervention and control over international production.
149
  
The Ottoman buffer and English primitive accumulation  
The states best placed to take advantage of this structural shift were those where the 
Ottoman geopolitical buffer was most keenly felt. As we have seen the protagonists 
most intensely involved in the continental conflicts of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries were concerned with the Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean and South 
East Europe. In this context England featured as little more than an ‗impotent 
onlooker‘150 in European affairs. Compared to the near permanence of warfare on the 
continent, Early Modern England was marked by a condition of geopolitical isolation. 
England‘s lack of involvement in continental conflicts from 1450 onwards was a 
fundamental factor in its development towards capitalism.
151
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One of the more peculiar features of Tudor ‗absolutism‘ flowed directly from this 
isolation – a regression in the military resources held by the state and aristocracy. For 
example, in the 1470s the Spanish and English military manpower numbered 20,000 
and 25,000 men respectively. By the 1550s, Spain‘s manpower had risen to 150,000 
while England‘s manpower had fallen by five thousand to 20,000.152 Disarmament 
among the English aristocracy was even more pronounced: ‗in 1500, every English 
peer bore arms; by Elizabeth's time… only half the aristocracy had any fighting 
experience‘.153 This demilitarization meant that England effectively ‗skipped over‘ the 
development of strong, tax appropriating bureaucratic state structures characteristic of 
French and Spanish absolutism in the sixteenth century onwards.
154
  
This exceptional historical trajectory proved especially conducive to capitalist 
development in the sixteenth century. Firstly, demilitarization within the nobility meant 
limited access to the means of coercion required to raise feudal rates of exploitation. 
This inability to ‗squeeze‘155 peasant surpluses meant that the option of dispossessing 
peasants and exploiting them through market mechanisms became an increasingly 
preferable means for ruling class reproduction.
156
 Secondly, the English state did not 
possess the coercive or administrative strength to prevent attempts by the nobility to 
‗engross, consolidate and enclose‘ land.‘157 This contrasted with, for example, the 
French state, which competed with the nobility over agrarian surpluses by habitually 
protecting the peasantry from attempts at dispossession.
158
 Thus, thirdly, isolation 
meant that the English ruling class was unusually homogenous,
159
 with a relative 
absence of social stratification across the state, the pre-existing landed aristocracy and 
an emergent commercial class. This was because under conditions of demilitarization, 
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influence and office replaced patented peerage as a basis for aristocratic power, 
making the landed class peculiarly ‗civilian‘ ‗commercial‘ and ‗common‘.160  
These three factors help to explain one of the fundamental propositions of 
Robert Brenner‘s argument of the origins of capitalism: that it was in England alone 
that agrarian revolts were met with a unified and successful attempt by the state and 
landed class to remove the peasantry from their land through the enclosures.
161
 As 
peasants were dispossessed, they turned to an alternative means to secure their 
means of subsistence and thus social reproduction: selling their labour to landlords and 
capitalist tenants in return for a wage.
162
 The persistent success of the state-nobility 
alliance in dispossessing the peasantry of the means of production therefore led to the 
emergence of ‗free‘ class of wage-labourers. The social property relations through 
which surplus was appropriated were thus transformed, from the extra-economic 
means of feudalism to the ‗economic‘ or ‗market‘ mechanisms of agrarian capitalism.  
Considering that English isolation was such a crucial condition for the 
processes outlined in the ‗Brenner thesis‘163, a fuller exposition of capitalism‘s origins 
requires that this isolation is satisfactorily accounted for. As the preceding argument 
has shown, this isolation should be understood as an inter-societal condition arising 
from the continental preoccupation with the Ottoman Empire. The peculiar social form 
that this isolation gave rise to proved especially conducive to the symbiotic unity of 
state and landed class interests that underpinned the growth agrarian capitalism in 
England. When considered in this specifically international context, English 
development in the sixteenth century can be best understood as a form of ‗combined 
development‘; the developmental outcomes of an inter-societal condition rooted in the 
uneven relation of England to the Euro-Ottoman geopolitical milieu. Ottoman 
geopolitical pressure must therefore be seen as a cause in the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism in England. 
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Conclusion – The Ottoman Empire as a Vector of U&CD 
The duality of Euro-Ottoman relations – both belligerent and collaborative – was thus a 
crucial driver in some of the key developments in the Early Modern period. By 
establishing a node of international trade, the Ottomans contributed to the 
internationalisation of merchant activity and a cultural revival in Europe. But more 
significantly, through its military conflict with the Habsburgs, the Ottomans abetted the 
Reformation and break-up of Habsburg hegemony. This gave Northwest Europe the 
geopolitical space to conduct modern state-building. In particular, this buffer gave rise 
to peculiar fusion of interests among the landed nobility and the state in England, which 
was a crucial cause in the process of primitive capitalist accumulation. Moreover, 
through its geopolitical policies, the Ottomans actively and directly brought about a 
structural shift away from Mediterranean trade and the concomitant ascendancy of 
Italian city-states, toward the Atlantic powers that would eventually come to dominate 
the world through colonialism. It must be emphasised that none of these developments 
were sufficient conditions for the emergence of capitalism; there were numerous other 
causal chains – vectors of uneven and combined development – both European and 
extra-European that must be incorporated into a full understanding of capitalism‘s 
origins. Yet it is difficult to establish a proper appreciation of the key developments in 
sixteenth century history and the European trajectory towards capitalism without 
looking at the Euro-Ottoman relation as a fundamental determinant.  
This additional empirical framework raises serious questions around the 
theorisation of capitalism‘s origins. Indeed, a central contention of this paper is that the 
spatial limitations imposed by Eurocentrism have had significant consequences for the 
manner in which we theorise historical processes. In presenting this argument, I hope 
to have contributed to the recent explosion in literature that has sought to ‗provincialize 
Europe,‘ by bringing out the international dimension of capitalism‘s development. But 
moreover, I have sought to provide an alternative theoretical framework – Trotsky‘s 
theory of Uneven and Combined Development – within which this non-Eurocentric 
historical analysis can contribute to a renewed conceptualisation of capitalism‘s origins. 
For U&CD not only helps us capture the historical significance of interactive relations 
between societies, it also gives these relations theoretical expression, thus elevating 
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their importance as a field of investigation; one that is irreducible to, yet fundamentally 
related to, the sociology and history of any given society. In doing so, U&CD broadens 
our field of vision beyond the confines of Eurocentrism, by internalising at the level of 
theory a dimension of concrete reality – ‗the international‘ – hitherto considered 
external to dominant studies of the origins of capitalism. My argument thus also raises 
the significance of (a sociologically sensitive) IR as a privileged vantage point from 
which to analyse the socially distinct determinations arising from the international that 
fed into the origins of capitalism. 
What of the supposed Eurocentrism of U&CD itself? As we have seen, the 
limitation of U&CD to the capitalist epoch tends to reproduce the Eurocentric 
assumptions of historical priority and methodological internalism. I have argued that by 
breaking out of the temporal fetters of capitalism, U&CD can also transcend the spatial 
provincialism associated with Eurocentric social theory. By theorising the very history 
of capitalism‘s origins as the combined product of a multiplicity of spatio-temporally 
uneven determinations, the incorporation of non-Europeans into this process is opened 
as a potentially illuminating avenue for further research. As such, both theoretical and 
historical elements also support calls for the extension of U&CD beyond the epoch of 
capitalism alone by positing its transhistorical and therefore general applicability.  
 
